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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________ 
 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
  Plaintiff Janice Silverman appeals the dismissal of her 
complaint claiming violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et. seq., and the denial of her motion 
for declaratory and injunctive relief.  Plaintiff alleges that 
she was required to guaranty a loan for the benefit of her spouse 
in violation of the ECOA.  Assuming, without deciding, that 
plaintiff's right to initiate an action for damages based upon 
such alleged violation is barred by the statute of limitations, 
no such bar exists to asserting such violation as a defense to 
efforts to collect on said guaranty.  Plaintiff did not forfeit 
her right to raise such defense merely by her failure to 
institute an independent action to assert it.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint 
and denial of declaratory and injunctive relief and remand for 
further proceedings for the reasons hereinafter set forth. 
 
 
 I. Facts and Procedural History 
  In February of 1986, Hunt's Pier Associates ("Hunt's 
Pier"), a New Jersey general partnership, borrowed $10,000,000 
(the "Loan") from Atlantic Financial Federal ("Atlantic").  
  
Atlantic required all Hunt's Pier partners to guaranty the 
repayment individually, jointly, and severally.  Plaintiff, one 
of the partners' wives, was required to sign the Guaranty 
Agreement ("Guaranty"). 
  In January of 1990, Atlantic was declared insolvent, 
and the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") took control of the 
Loan.  Hunt's Pier defaulted and ultimately filed a voluntary 
bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code on October 23, 1991.  The RTC approved and 
supported the Third Amended Plan of Reorganization 
("Reorganization Plan" or "Plan"), and in February of 1993, the 
bankruptcy court confirmed it.  The Plan extended the payment 
period upon the Loan, expressly leaving the Guaranty intact. 
  Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P. ("Eastrich") 
subsequently acquired the RTC's right, title, and interest in the 
Loan.  On April 21, 1994, Eastrich confessed judgment against the 
Loan's guarantors, including plaintiff, in state court. 
  On May 9, 1994, plaintiff filed suit in federal court, 
alleging Atlantic and Eastrich violated her rights under the 
ECOA:  (1) Atlantic, by requiring her signature on the Guaranty 
although she allegedly had no other connection to the transaction 
and (2) Eastrich, by instituting state collection proceedings 
against her.  In Count II of her complaint, plaintiff alleged the 
Reorganization Plan altered the Guaranty to her detriment and 
  
without securing her approval, which should have resulted in 
discharge of her guaranty. 
  Silverman moved for injunctive relief in federal 
court,1 requesting Eastrich be enjoined from executing on the 
$10,000,000 state court confession of judgment against her.  In 
addition to her claims against Atlantic and Eastrich, she also 
argued that the RTC violated the ECOA and its implementing 
regulations by approving the Reorganization Plan and failing to 
reevaluate the legality of her obligation under the Guaranty.  
Eastrich filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for 
failure to state a claim.  On July 13, 1994, the district court 
denied injunctive and declaratory relief and granted Eastrich's 
motion to dismiss.  Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
 
 II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
  The district court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  This court has jurisdiction over the district 
court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  We have plenary review of the district court's 
dismissal of the complaint.  Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 
(3d Cir. 1993).  We review the denial of injunctive and 
declaratory relief for abuse of discretion, and in making this 
determination we will exercise plenary review over the district 
                     
 
   1  Although plaintiff applied for a preliminary injunction, the district court noted the parties' 
agreement to treating it as a motion for final injunctive and declaratory relief.  Silverman v. 
Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 857 F.Supp. 447, 449 (E.D.Pa. 1994). 
  
court's conclusions of law.  Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc., 906 F.2d 934, 937 (3d 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Envtl. 
Resources, 923 F.2d 1071, 1073 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
 
 III. Discussion 
  The ECOA provides that it is unlawful "for any creditor 
to discriminate against any [credit] applicant with respect to 
any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of . . . marital 
status."  15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).  The Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (the "Board"), charged with making 
implementing regulations, provided in pertinent part in 
Regulation B: 
 
  Except as provided in this paragraph, a 
creditor shall not require the signature of 
an applicant's spouse or other person, other 
than a joint applicant, on any credit 
instrument if the applicant qualifies under 
the creditor's standards of creditworthiness 
for the amount and terms of the credit 
requested. 
 
12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d).   
 
 
 A. Standing 
  Eastrich argues plaintiff lacks standing to assert a 
violation of the ECOA.  Section 1691(a) of the ECOA prohibits 
creditors from discriminating against any "applicant."  An 
earlier version of Regulation B had defined an applicant as 
 
  
  any person who requests or has received an 
extension of credit from a creditor, and 
includes any person who is or may be 
contractually liable regarding an extension 
of credit other than a guarantor, surety, 
endorser, or similar party. 
 
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e)(1985)(emphasis added).  In a subsequent 
amendment, the definition was revised to include guarantors as 
"applicants."   
  The parties' dispute on this issue stems from the two 
dates provided in the amendment: 
 
  The revised regulation and official staff 
commentary will become effective December 16, 
1985.  However, creditors have the option of 
continuing to comply with the Board's current 
regulation and existing interpretations, 
which remain in effect, until October 1, 
1986. 
 
Revision of Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,018 (1985).  Eastrich 
contends that the revised definition should be interpreted as 
effective from the mandatory compliance date, October 1, 1986, 
leaving Silverman without standing.  Eastrich relies upon 
Boatmen's First National Bank v. Koger, in which the court 
applied the mandatory compliance date as the effective date and 
ruled the guarantor thereby lacked standing.  784 F.Supp. 815 
(D.Kan. 1992); see also Mayes v. Chrysler Credit Corporation, 37 
F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1994)(adopting, without discussion, effective 
date of October 1, 1986). 
  The district court declined to follow Koger, noting the 
Koger court did not discuss or even mention the December 16, 1985 
  
date.  If October 1, 1986 is the effective date, then the 
December 16, 1985 date is unmoored to any purpose.  In effect, 
the Koger decision renders this latter date entirely superfluous.  
This violates a basic tenet of statutory construction, equally 
applicable to regulatory construction, that a statute "should be 
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that 
no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another 
unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error."  
2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction, § 46.06, at 119-20 (5th ed. 1992)("Sutherland 
Statutory Construction"). 
  The Board's discussion of the revised Regulation B 
supports the district court's interpretation of the effective 
date.  The mandatory compliance date should not be misconstrued 
as the effective date of the revisions.  The prior version of 
Part 202 was redesignated as Part 202a, and the Board repeatedly 
referred to the "new [revised] Part 202" as effective on December 
16, 1985.2  The Board specifically commented that several 
revisions may necessitate "operational changes," and the October 
1, 1986 date offered creditors a grace period to implement such 
                     
    
2
  Under the section entitled, "Effective Date," the Board noted a "new Part 202 is added to be 
effective on December 16, 1985" and made no mention of an optional compliance period.  
Revision of Regulation B, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,018 (1985).  Later, under the section, "Supplementary 
Information," the Board added the language giving creditors the "option" of continuing to follow 
the then existing Part 202.  Id. 
  
changes.  50 Fed. Reg. 48,018.  However, the Board deemed 
expansion of the term "applicant" as a "substantive" change not 
requiring modification of procedures.  Id.  The district court 
emphasized the fact that the ECOA has from its inception 
prohibited requiring spousal guaranties.  Hence, conferring 
standing upon guarantors places no additional requirements upon 
creditors, which accords with the Board's commentary, and thus 
the expanded definition of "applicant" was immediately effective 
as of December 16, 1985.  
 
 
 B. Statute of Limitations 
  The statute of limitations for bringing an ECOA claim 
is two years from the date of an alleged violation.  The district 
court concluded that the statute of limitations had run on the 
initial alleged violation and that the failure to release her 
from the Guaranty during the bankruptcy proceedings, as well as 
the institution of collection proceedings against her, did not 
constitute new violations of the ECOA, each with its own two-year 
limitations period.  We need not reach those issues because we 
conclude that the alleged violation is not barred as a defense. 
 
 
   III. Right of Recoupment 
  There are numerous circumstances under which a 
guarantor may institute an action to declare his or her guaranty 
void and seek damages or other relief.  The expiration of the 
  
statute of limitations calculated from the execution of said 
guaranty may bar the institution of such independent action.  No 
such bar exists, however, to the utilization of such grounds as a 
defense. 
  A guarantor may have the right to challenge a loan as 
usurious or on other recognized grounds.  See, e.g., McCarthy v. 
First Nat'l Bank, 223 U.S. 493, 498 (1911)("As to the defense 
[that a contract is usurious], there is no statute of 
limitations.  Whenever sued the debtor may plead the usurious 
contract and be relieved from paying any interest whatever.  But 
if he elects to avail himself of the cause of action, he must sue 
'within two years from the time the usurious transaction 
occurred'").  However there may be no need to do so, if no effort 
is made to seek collection from the guarantor.  Numerous other 
examples exist which do not and should not bar debtors or 
guarantors from asserting such defenses notwithstanding that 
independent actions based thereon are time-barred.  See, e.g., 
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pasqualis-Politi, 800 F.Supp. 1297, 1301-02 
(W.D.Pa. 1992)(assertion of otherwise time-barred securities 
fraud claim is permissible recoupment defense in an action for 
judgment on promissory notes if related to the nature of 
plaintiff's demand), aff'd sub nom. Bhatla v. United States 
Capital Corp., 990 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1993); Household Consumer 
Discount Co. v. Vespaziani, 490 PA 209, 217-24 (1980)(statute of 
  
limitations does not bar recoupment claim of Truth in Lending Act 
violation to lenders' suit to collect on loans). 
  In this matter, plaintiff retained the right to assert 
the violation when efforts were made to collect and enforce the 
Guaranty.3  See Integra Bank v. Freeman, 839 F.Supp. 326, 330 
(E.D.Pa. 1993)("Claims by way of recoupment are 'never barred by 
the statute of limitations so long as the main action itself is 
timely'")(quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 
(1935)).  Although plaintiff brought this suit in federal court, 
her ECOA claim was raised in direct response to Eastrich's state 
court confession of judgment, which did not require or provide 
for an answering pleading.  The Loan note provided that in the 
event of default, the maker, Hunt's Pier, "authorizes any 
attorney of any court of record to appear for Maker and confess 
judgment for the same . . . against Maker in favor of the holder 
hereof."  App. at 188.  Through the confession of judgment 
provision, Hunt's Pier, in effect, gave consent to having 
judgment entered against itself and by extension, its guarantors.  
Such a provision permits the creditor or its attorney simply to 
apply to the court for judgment against the debtor in default 
without requiring or permitting the debtor or guarantors to 
respond at that juncture.  The Guaranty further provided that the 
guarantors irrevocably waived notice of "the commencement or 
                     
    
3
  Pennsylvania law requires that "the defense asserted by way of recoupment must be related 
to the nature of the demand brought by the plaintiff."  Mellon Bank, 800 F.Supp. at 1301 
(citation omitted).  This "mutuality of demand" requirement is clearly met in this case.  Id. 
  
prosecution of any enforcement proceeding, including any 
proceeding in any court, against Borrower or any other person or 
entity with respect to any of the Guaranteed Obligations."  App. 
at 242.  In fact, after the state court entered judgment, 
plaintiff received a notice from a prothonotary of the state 
court, notifying her that a judgment of confession had been 
entered against her.  App. at 295-96.  Thus, in essence, 
plaintiff's alleged ECOA violation is asserted as a defense to 
the state confession of judgment.   
  We, therefore, reverse the district court's 
determination that the ECOA cannot be used defensively.  The 
district court held that the "ECOA's statutory scheme does not 
contemplate the invalidation of a guaranty as a remedy for an 
ECOA violation, and that a defensive use of the ECOA is therefore 
impermissible."  857 F.Supp. at 453.  Although the Integra court 
noted that some courts have refused to grant relief from 
obligations under an unlawful credit instrument, we find the 
court's analysis of the ECOA persuasive:   
 
  Congress -- in enacting the ECOA -- intended 
that creditors not affirmatively benefit from 
proscribed acts of credit discrimination.  To 
permit creditors -- especially sophisticated 
credit institutions -- to affirmatively 
benefit by disregarding the requirements of 
the ECOA would seriously undermine the 
Congressional intent to eradicate gender and 
marital status based credit discrimination. 
 
Integra, 839 F.Supp. at 329.  This interpretation of the statute 
best forwards its purposes, particularly in light of the 
  
inclusion of a broad remedial provision, Section 1691e(c), in the 
ECOA.4  Furthermore, as the Integra court observed, "[t]his rule 
places a creditor in no worse position than if it had adhered to 
the law when the credit transaction occurred.  A creditor may not 
claim to have relied factually upon a guarantor's assets if it 
has never requested nor received financial information regarding 
them.  Further, a creditor may not claim legal reliance on a 
signature that was illegally required in the first instance."  
Id. at 329. 
  If Atlantic did in fact violate the ECOA, then 
plaintiff may have a valid defense and obtain relief from her 
obligations under the Guaranty.  We note however that if 
plaintiff's guaranty is voided, this would not void the 
underlying debt obligation nor any other guaranties.  See id. 
("[W]hile an ECOA violation should not void the underlying credit 
transaction[,] an offending creditor should not be permitted to 
look for payment to parties who, but for the ECOA violation, 
would not have incurred personal liability on the underlying debt 
in the first instance").  The district court ruled in favor of 
defendant as a matter of law and did not make a factual 
determination that Atlantic required her signature solely based 
upon her marital relationship with a borrower.  Although the 
                     
    
4
  Section 1691e(c) provides that "[u]pon application by an aggrieved applicant, the 
appropriate United States district court or any other court of competent jurisdiction may grant 
such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed under 
this subchapter."  15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c). 
  
district court noted plaintiff was not a partner in Hunt's Pier, 
Atlantic may have justifiably required her to guaranty the loan 
if it determined her husband was not independently creditworthy. 
  Eastrich also raises another critical consideration.  
It claims it is not a "creditor" as defined in the statute: 
 
  Creditor means a person who, in the ordinary 
course of business, regularly participates in 
the decision of whether or not to extend 
credit.  The term includes a creditor's 
assignee, transferee, or subrogee who so 
participates . . . . A person is not a 
creditor regarding any violation of the act 
or this regulation committed by another 
creditor unless the person knew or had 
reasonable notice of the act, policy, or 
practice that constituted the violation 
before becoming involved in the credit 
transaction . . . . 
 
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(l)(emphasis added).  If Eastrich was a holder 
in due course and thus, not a "creditor," then it is not subject 
to plaintiff's ECOA defense.  The district court did not address 
this issue, and the record lacks sufficient factual findings for 
this court to make such a determination.  If plaintiff was 
compelled to execute the Guaranty in violation of the ECOA and 
Eastrich knew or had reason to know of the violation, plaintiff 
is not barred from asserting the violation as a defense to any 
efforts by Eastrich to collect thereon, notwithstanding that her 
right to institute an independent action may be time-barred.  If 
plaintiff was required to sign said Guaranty without any reliance 
by the lender upon her creditworthiness, solely for the purpose 
  
of expediting a loan for her spouse and his business, that 
Guaranty cannot be enforced against her by the original lender or 
any subsequent holder of the loan who knew or had reason to know 
of those circumstances.  Although such circumstances would have 
permitted the institution of an independent action within the 
statutory period, the violation may be asserted as a defense at 
any time following efforts to enforce the Guaranty.  To hold 
otherwise would not protect against the discrimination which the 
statute seeks to prevent and prohibit.  Accordingly, we will 
remand to the district court for a hearing to determine, 
factually and legally, whether Atlantic violated the ECOA in 
requiring plaintiff's signature and whether Eastrich knew or had 
reason to know of the violation when it acquired the Guaranty.  
On the basis of these findings, if appropriate, the district 
court should reconsider granting the request for injunctive 
relief. 
 
 
 IV. Conclusion 
  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district 
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and denial of 
injunctive and declaratory relief.  We remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 __________________ 
 
